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CASE DIGEST
by Robert N. Schlesinger*

The materials in this section are intended to provide a concise
overview of the case law relating to computer-assisted legal research
("CALR").' These cases cover a broad area, including anti-trust
law, attorney-client privilege relating to CALR negotiations with the
government, attorneys' fees as including CALR costs, breach of contract actions, commercial law, copyright infringement, securities
fraud, tort claims, and judicial decisions where a CALR system was
used by the court.
Each case is summarized in a separate digest entry. Each entry
contains the following information:
* case name
* case citation
" subsequent history (if any)
* summary of salient facts
* legal analysis and holding of the court (or agency)
The digest entries are organized alphabetically.

RI

Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977).

Albert H. Carter, a prisoner at the Texas Department of Corrections, was investigated by the court as a pro se litigant proceeding in
forma pauperis. The court conducted an extensive investigation of
Carter's many case filings.
Attempting to locate all of Carter's filings, the court corresponded with all the courts located at Carter's principal places of
residence. Throughout the investigation and the preparation of the
* B.S. 1970, University of Iowa.

Mr. Schlesinger is currently a law student in

the SCALE program at Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles, Califoria.
1. The term "CALR" refers to computer-assisted legal research. This type of legal research uses a computer to quickly isolate and retrieve fact patterns, text and/or
pre-indexed legal concepts from the computer data bank.
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court's opinion, additional cases were discovered in which Carter
was a party. Finally, the court utilized the LEXIS system to search
the available federal and state court libraries for any published
opinions and citations which listed Albert Carter as a party. By using the search request "NAME (ALBERT W/3 CARTER)," the court
obtained citations to twenty-two reported opinions. The court
stated that:
LEXIS proved invaluable as a research tool in that it provided a
ready list of reporter citations to published Carter 2opinions, information not available from a review of the case files.
By the end of its investigation, the court had found 178 cases known
to have been filed by Carter throughout the country, many of which
were frivolous and malicious.
Following the investigation, the court held, inter alia, that (1) in
light of the numerous frivolous and malicious cases fied by Carter
in forma pauperis and the continuous misrepresentation of his
financial status, a stronger burden would be imposed upon him in
future actions to both prove his indigency and that the action was in
good faith and not malicious or without arguable merit, and (2) in
determining whether a dismissal of actions would be with prejudice,
a case-by-case review would be made, considering various factors,
including the status of each lawsuit at the time of the order of dismissal and his prior or subsequent filing of the same or related
causes of action.
The court also issued a mandatory injunction requiring, inter
alia, that Carter send a copy of every complaint or petition hereafter fied by him to the staff law clerk in the Southern District of
Texas, in an effort to limit Carter to good faith, non-malicious, meritorious litigation.
The court suggested tighter controls on pro se litigants proceeding in informa pauperis, stating that:
Although an atypical prisoner litigant, Carter is not alone. Other
inmates, while not as experienced in law and procedure as Carter,
have made a hobby while in prison with little else to do of engaging
in protracted federal court litigation at the expense of the federal
government. To date, few controls have been placed on their efforts, chiefly because of the time required to piece together and
compare the filings and practices of a single multiple filer in different courts, a lack of appellate guidance in this area and the difficulty in promulgating an effective remedy short of a total denial of
access to the courts.
However, tighter controls such as those fashioned in this opinion are on the horizon as federal courts now begin to reach a plateau where, because of. .. technical advancements such as LEXIS,
2. 452 F. Supp. at 989-90.
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they can attain for the first time
an overview of the handiwork of
3
these abusive multiple filers.

R2

Computer Searching Service Corp. v. Ryan, 439 F.2d 6, 2 CLSR
984 (2d Cir. 1971).

In June 1966, West Publishing Company ("West") sued Law Research Service, Inc. ("LRS"), alleging that LRS purported to do computer-assisted legal research and had copied certain West Key
Number digest indices, thereby infringing various West copyrights.
See also West Publishing Co. v. Law Research Service, Inc., 3 CLSR
561 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) [Case R18 infra]. West further alleged that this
material was put on computer tapes, which became a "data bank" to
be printed out as needed. West's complaint sought both injunctive
and monetary relief.
In 1970, after a pretrial order had been entered, West moved to
join Computer Searching Service Corporation ("CSSC") as a defendant on the ground that CSSC, an eight-three percent owned
subsidiary of LRS, was "threatening to take over the infringing acts"
of LRS. West claimed that LRS had transferred the supposedly infringing data bank to CSSC. West's motion was granted. Thereafter, West ified an amended and supplemental complaint, which
CSSC answered with a number of defenses and counterclaims
(some of which had not previously been made part of the case by
LRS) and a demand for a jury trial. LRS proffered a new answer as
well.
Prior to filing its answer, however CSSC instituted a separate
proceeding in which it also asserted its counterclaims. 4 West then
moved, inter alia, to strike CSSC's counterclaims and demand for a
jury trial. District Court Judge Sylvester J. Ryan granted the motion. CSSC petitioned for mandamus, seeking vacation of Judge
Ryan's order. The appellate court affirmed Judge Ryan's order, stating that the trial judge had acted "reasonably" in striking CSSC's
counterclaims and jury demand, since CSSC's claims would be litigated in the pending action against West and it would be inefficient
and inequitable to delay the action between West and LRS, otherwise ready for trial and high on the trial calendar, merely to allow
CSSC to press its allegations as counterclaims. The appellate court
further stated that the trial judge's granting of West's motion to
strike CSSC's counterclaims and jury demand, did not deprive
3. Id. at 1004.
4. See Computer Searching Service Corp. v. West Publishing Co., No. 70 Civ.
3692 (S.D.N.Y., ified Aug. 25, 1970).
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CSSC of its right to litigate those issues because (1) CSSC had already instituted a separate suit against West, which incorporated
word-for-word the allegations of the counterclaim, and (2) much of
the counterclaim might also be deemed an appropriate defense to
the claims of West.
The appellate court also found that CSSC should not be treated
as a general party defendant because the issues to be tried against
CSSC would, in effect, be the same as if West had already obtained
an injunction against LRS and proceeded against CSSC as a party
bound by such an injunction due to its "active concert or participation."'5 Thus, CSSC could assert only those defenses which would
be available to it in that posture. The appellate court also found
that CSSC was not entitled to a jury trial because, inter alia, West
agreed to cure its complaint for damages against CSSC by a further
amendment to conform to a district court order, allowing joinder of
CSSC as a defendant only for the limited purpose of injunctive relief. [For the results of this litigation, see Case R18 infra.]

R3

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eastex, Inc., 16
F.E.P. Cases 1062 (E.D. Tex. 1976), vacated and remanded, 16
F.E.P. Cases 1063 (5th Cir. 1978).

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
filed a motion to compel compliance with and to modify a consent
decree and application by Eastex, Inc. ("Eastex") for attorneys' fees
and costs. The court denied EEOC's motion and awarded Eastex
its attorneys' fees and costs, including CALR expenses in using the
LEXIS system.
On appeal, the award of attorneys' fees and costs was vacated
and remanded, in light of ChristiansburgGarment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 694, 701
(1978), since the district court did not indicate the legal test it had
applied in awarding attorneys' fees to Eastex and the district court's
order did not contain sufficient facts to resolve the legal contention
of either party on appeal.

R4

Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), affd in part, rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), 2
CLSR 309, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
5. FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d).
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Law Research Service, Inc. ("LRS") entered into a five-year contract with the computer division of Sperry Rand Corporation
("Sperry Rand").
LRS, accumulating substantial debts, offered
100,000 shares of stock to the public to raise new capital. Material
facts were omitted from the offering circular concerning a dispute
between the corporations, which had resulted in Sperry Rand's refusal to allow LRS to use its computers to process inquiries. Subsequently, LRS instituted litigation against Sperry Rand.
Plaintiffs, thirteen purchasers of LRS stock, brought suit against
LRS, the president-principal stockholder of LRS, and the underwriter of the public offering. (LRS and its president brought crossclaims against the underwriter, who also brought cross-claims
against them and a third-party claim against LRS' treasurer.) The
plaintiffs recovered $32,000 in compensatory damages. Punitive
damages for violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19336 were assessed by the jury against the president of LRS
and the underwriter for approximately $27,000 and $13,000, respectively, for their fraudulent, wanton and reckless conduct. The district court reasoned that punitive damages would serve to deter the
kind of fraudulent conduct found in the present case, stating that
such damages were in "accord ... with the overall purpose of the
anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act. ' 7 The district court further
reasoned that the absence in the 1933 Act of a provision similar to
section 28(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 indicated a congressional
intent to permit punitive damages in actions brought under the 1933
Act.
The appellate court affirmed the district court opinion, while reversing the award of punitive damages. Though the court recognized that punitive damages would serve to punish wrongdoers and
deter violations of the 1933 Act, it reasoned that there already existed an extensive "arsenal of weapons" under the federal securities
laws for deterrence and retribution. 8 The court further reasoned
that when a material misstatement was disseminated to the public
and the resultant harm was widespread, the addition of punitive
damages to the arsenal "could well bankrupt an otherwise honest
underwriter or issuer who egregiously erred in one instance."9
For another reported decision arising from this case, see Globus,
Inc. v. Law Research Service, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
affid, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
6.
7.
8.
9.

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
287 F. Supp. at 194.
418 F.2d at 1285.
Id.
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State of Ohio ex rel. Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.
2d 847 (1974).

A proposed non-profit corporation sought to compel the Ohio
Secretary of State to accept its articles of incorporation. The Ohio
Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that the promotion of homosexuality as a valid lifestyle was contrary to the public policy of Ohio and
that the Secretary of State had properly refused to accept the articles.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stern stated that the majority's
opinion permitted the Secretary of State to refuse to accept certain
articles of incorporation on public policy grounds and that homosexuality was now being treated as a crime or against public policy, or
both. Justice Stern used the CALR system, LEXIS, to show that
past judicial pronouncements of the court failed to support the majority's public policy pronouncement. Nowhere in the recorded decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, as disclosed by LEXIS, had any
justice ever used the term "homosexual" or "homosexuality," or
even discussed the policy implications of such a lifestyle.

R6

Holcomb v. United States, 543 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1976).

A husband and wife sued for refund of a penalty assessment
leveled under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1954), for failure to pay corporate
withholding taxes. The Government filed a counterclaim for the
balance due. During the trial, the Government was questioned by
the district judge concerning the proposition that the Holcomb's defense to the Government's counterclaim would be the statute of limitations. The Government counsel stated that the "Danielson case"
was controlling in the present instance, but he could not recall its
citation. The district court granted summary judgment for the Government and the Holcombs appealed.
On appeal, the appellate court put the name "Danielson"
through the entire federal tax library of the LEXIS system and
found only four cases, none of which had any relevance whatever to
the present case. Furthermore, the appellate judge's own search of
the point was likewise fruitless. The appellate court held that
under the evidence, and in light of the factual issues, the case was
not appropriate for summary judgment, reversed the district court
order, and remanded the case for trial.

R7

Husky Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 447 F. Supp. 339 (D.C.
Wyo. 1978).
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The Department of Energy ("DOE") issued a final administrative order denying Husky Oil Company's ("Husky") application for
an adjustment in the standard of exception from the crude oil entitlement program under 10 C.F.R. § 211.67. Husky sought injunctive
relief from the DOE order. Cross motions for summary judgment
were filed.
In the heat of argument during the trial, DOE's counsel "broadly
hinted that the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ("TECA")
would eventually find for DOE."'1 The court stated that:
We are not unaware that 84 percent of the cases decided by
TECA (as shown by Tenth Circuit LEXIS information) have held
for the government. But that does not give DOE a bureaucratic liown
cense to ignore the mandate of Congress, the department's
11
rules and regulations, and the evidence of this case.
The court issued the injunction, granting Husky's motion for a summary judgment and denying DOE's motion for a summary judgment.

R8

In re Law Research Service, Inc., 5 CLSR 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
affid in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Law Research Service,
Inc. v. General Automation, Inc., 5 CLSR 223 (2d Cir. 1974).

Debtor-in-possession, Law Research Service, Inc. ("LRS"), objected in a Chapter XI proceedings to a claim made by General
Automation, Inc. ("General Automation") that the greater of two invoices of claimant was the correct invoice. LRS' objection was denied by the trial court due to the absence of any correspondence
protesting the alleged overcharge. The appellate court, however, reversed and remanded, finding a lack of evidence in the record to
support the finding that the second invoice was correct.
LRS also objected to the claim that software received from General Automation was complete. LRS asserted that it did not receive
12
The
a manual explaining what to do "if something breaks down."'
manual
repair
of
a
delivery
court rejected this claim, finding that the
was not required by the contract and that LRS had failed to produce
any correspondence complaining of this failure. Further testimony
revealed that no repair manuals are furnished for "special application programming to make computer research for lawyers" and that
was
there was no need for the repair manual since the equipment
3
filed.'
was
petition
XI
Chapter
the
when
still operating
10.
11.
12.
13.

447 F. Supp. at 349.
Id.
5 CLSR at 222.
Id.
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Law Research Service, Inc. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1
CLSR 1002 (Supreme Ct., N.Y. Cty. 1968).

Law Research Service, Inc. ("LRS") sued Western Union Telegraph Co. ("Western Union") for specific performance and for damages in connection with two joint venture agreements allegedly
entered into for the delivery of legal citation data to all subscribers
of the plaintiffs services in the United States through defendant's
facilities. Western Union filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the first of the two alleged agreements was not a
binding contract, and that the second agreement contained the only
legal relationship between the parties, with its terms violated in numerous material respects by plaintiff.
The court held that Western Union had breached its contract by
failing to advise LRS that the octal digits employed in its programming had to be used sequentially to maximize system efficiency.
LRS did not learn of this fact until over six months after the octal
digits were depleted due to inefficient utilization. This depletion in
octal digits resulted in a delay in LRS' service to its subscribers and
prevented LRS from programming additional data or loading more
material onto the computer.
The court also ruled that Western Union breached the contract
by failing to furnish LRS with billing tapes until more than eight
months after execution of the contract. Since inquiries for citation
data went directly to Western Union, without notification to LRS,
LRS "remained in the dark about such matters." 14 Under the contract, LRS was to be notified of inquiries for citation data. To a degree, Western Union explained its failure by alleging that LRS'
equipment was not programmed in the computer language in which
Western Union's billing tapes were transcribed.

R10

Law Research Service of Missouri, Inc. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 336 F. Supp. 510, 3 CLSR 161 (E.D. Mo. 1971).

A tort action by a legal research service against a computer facility and another legal research service for interference with contractual relations stated a claim upon which relief could be granted,
although no express malice was alleged. The court reasoned that
since intentional interference is malicious in law, even if it is the result of good motives and there is no express malice, "the promisee
may recover for any act which retards, makes more difficult, or prevents performance or makes performance of a contract of less value
14. 1 CLSR at 1006-07.
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to him." 15
A contract claim involving the same parties was dismissed. The
court reasoned that the plaintiff was not a third-party beneficiary to
the contract between the defendants, and thus had no standing to
sue.

R11

Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Department of the Air
Force, 402 F. Supp. 460, 5 CLSR 1242 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 566
F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Mead Data Central, Inc., a competitor of West Publishing Company ("West"), sought, under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), 16 to compel disclosure of seven documents relating to a
licensing agreement between West and the Department of the Air
Force. This licensing agreement was entered into after the Air
Force determined that an agreement with West for permission to
use the copyrighted West "Key Number System" to expand and improve its CALR system (now known as FLITE-Federal Legal Information Through Electronics) was necessary to avoid copyright
infringement.
A number of the requested documents were made available at
the time of the initial request. The Air Force claimed privilege,
however, with regard to the seven documents in suit, providing only
a very brief description of these withheld documents. The trial
court held that Exception 5 of the Act' 7 applied to three of the requested documents on the grounds of "attorney-client privilege."
The court reasoned that these documents were prepared by attorneys on behalf of a client who invoked the privilege and were not
the type of material routinely discoverable by a private party in litigation with the agency. In one of these documents, for example, an
Air Force attorney stated that a licensing agreement for the use of
West's Key Number System was necessary to avoid infringement.
The trial court also held that the narrow exception for intraagency memoranda contained in Exception 5 of the Act applied to
the other four requested documents. The court found that these
documents reflected ongoing developments in the negotiating process and dealt strictly with pre-decisional deliberations and contract
negotiations, and disclosure was thus unwarranted, absent public
15. 336 F. Supp. at 511, 3 CLSR at 162.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
17. Exception 5 provides that the FOIA does not apply to inter-agency or intraagency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party other
than an agency in litigation with the agency. Id. at § 552(b) (5).
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bidding or procurement requirements. These documents consisted
of, inter alia, handwritten summaries of meetings and telephone
conversations concerning negotiations between the Air Force and
West, and related to the parties' negotiation positions and detailed
discussions concerning the licensing agreement.
The appellate court held that the trial court's interpretation of
the applicable FOIA exemption (Exception 5) was impermissibly
broad, and that remand was necessary for further proceedings
under a narrower construction. The Air Force had only provided a
very brief description of and claimed privilege with regard to the
seven documents litigated herein. The appellate court stated that
"[w] here there is ... a factual dispute over the nature of the information sought in a FOIA suit, the lack of access of the party seeking
disclosure undercuts the traditional adversarial theory of judicial
dispute resolution." 18
The appellate court also held that the Air Force did not adequately justify its claim that there was no non-exempt information
in the documents which could be disclosed, stating:
...when an agency seeks to withhold information it must provide
a relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the reasons
why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those claims
with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply.19
The appellate court accordingly directed the Air Force to provide an adequate description of the contents of the documents, the
reasons for the Air Force's decision to withhold the documents, an
indication of the proportion of the material which is non-exempt,
and how that non-exempt material is distributed throughout the
documents.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge McGowan criticized the majority
opinion, warning that:
As I understand it, the logic proceeds as follows:
a) Only confidential communications can be covered by the attorney-client privilege.
b) Legal opinions rendered by counsel on the basis of information
provided by a client can be privileged only if disclosure would tend
to reveal the underlying information, and that information was provided in confidence.
c) West knew the details of its contract negotiations with the Air
Force.
d) Therefore, the information provided to Air Force counsel was
not confidential, and the resulting legal opinions are not privileged.
Adoption of this position would go a long way toward eliminating
18. 566 F.2d at 250.
19. Id. at 251.
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20
the attorney-client privilege altogether.

R12 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 76 Civ. 3618
(S.D.N.Y., filed March 15, 1977), reprinted in 1977-1 Trade Case
61,332 (1977).
Mead Data Central, Inc. ("Mead") has been engaged in the business of operating a CALR service under the name LEXIS since
about 1973. Subscribers to LEXIS are located throughout the country, but are concentrated mainly in the Northeast. West Publishing
Company ("West") has been providing a competitive CALR service
under the name WESTLAW since about 1975.
Mead brought suit against West, under the Sherman Anti-trust
Act, 21 alleging that West has monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market in legal reporting by (1) acquiring, during the 1930's
and 1940's, a number of lawbook publishers; (2) improperly asserting copyrights not only in the "Keynote" references and headnotes
of the reported decisions, but also in the text of the judicial opinions
themselves, and by threatening legal action against anyone publishing such opinions or using them in commerce; and (3) attempting to
restrain competition and create a monopoly in the sub-market of
CALR. The complaint alleged that West was attempting to restrain
competition and create a monopoly by
(a) blocking a proposed agreement between Mead and
Shepard's Citations, Inc., through threats to deprive Shepard's of its early access to West publications, which expedited preparation of the Citators;
(b) entering into contracts with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth and D.C. Circuits for the printing of
20. Id. at 263-64 (J. McGowan, dissenting).
21. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any
other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890, as amended 1975).
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890, as amended 1974).
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their slip opinions, and seeking similar contracts with other
courts, thereby giving West early access to the opinions of
these courts and permitting them to be fed into the
WESTLAW data bank substantially before they are available to the rest of the public; and,
(c) entering into exclusive contracts with the Justice
Department and the Department of the Air Force ("Air
Force"), whereby in exchange for permitting the Air Force
to record on computer tapes West's complete federal law reports, including the "Keynotes" and headnotes, West would
obtain access to these tapes for use in the WESTLAW system. The Air Force contract provided that the Air Force
could not make those tapes available to others and, if it did
so, West had the right to cancel the license and to require
the return of its material.
Mead urged that these arrangements committed the use of public
funds to subsidize West's entry into the CALR business, whereas
Mead had to make a major capital investment of private funds to
convert such source materials to machine-readable form.
Mead sought a declaratory judgment (1) that West violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; (2) that the contracts
with the Justice Department and the Air Force were null and void;
and (3) that West had no copyright in the texts of judicial opinions.
Mead also sought treble damges, attorneys' fees, costs and an injunction restraining the use of West's copyrights for "predatory"
purposes, excluding West from the business of CALR, and directing
West to make available to the public in machine-readable form, free
of charge, at least one week prior to their appearance in any West
publication, such court opinions as West received as a result of an
exclusive or preferential contract with any other court.
2 2
It was recently reported that Mead had withdrawn its suit.

R13

Miller & Rhoads v. West, 442 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Va. 1977).

In a breach of contract action against officers and directors of a
foreign corporation, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that service of
process could properly be achieved by use of the Virginia Long-Arm
Statute. Neither party, however, cited any case authority construing the statute in that context. "After extensive research, including
the use of the LEXIS computer system, the court [was] satisfied
22. Lexis Drops Westlaw Antitrust Suit; Both Sides Claim Strategic Victory, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 18, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
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23
that no such case exists."

R14

State of Missouri ex rel. McNary v. Stussie, 518 S.W. 2d 630 (Mo.
1974).

In an original proceeding in mandamus, a prosecuting attorney
sought to compel the state circuit court to proceed with the trial of a
criminal case, without requiring that 18 to 20-year olds be summoned as jurors.24 The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that mandamus was appropriate to determine the validity of a statute, allegedly
reducing the minimum age for jurors to eighteen. Article m, § 28 of
the Missouri Constitution states, inter alia, that "no act shall be
amended by providing that words be stricken out or inserted, but
tothe words to be stricken out, or the words to be inserted ....
gether with the act or section amended, shall be set forth in full as
amended." The Court ruled that the statute reducing the minimum
age for jurors was not severable from the remainder of the act, and
that the absence of persons eighteen to twenty years of age in the
jury array did not deprive the defendant of due process.
The court used LEXIS to examine the existing statutes to which
the subject act, if valid, might be held applicable. Analysis of the
information retrieved from LEXIS revealed that a number of related
statutes contained some rather ambiguous, statutory terminology
relating to age. Furthermore, the court found that some of the statutes relating to age would lead to paradoxes if literally construed
and used with other statutes relating to age. In light of these findings, the court found the subject statute ambiguous and, therefore,
unconstitutional.

R15 In re the Ohio Bar Automated Research Systems, Opinion of

the Ohio Attorney General, Opinion No. 71-085, December 6,
1971, reprinted in 3 CLSR 767 (1971).
Section 307.84 of the Ohio Revised Code Annotated prohibits
any county office (including a court) from using automatic data
processing equipment without permission of the county automatic
data processing board. 25 The Attorney General found that the
Court of Appeals and the Court of Common Pleas were Ohio state
23. 442 F. Supp. at 343.
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.010 (1969).
25. The board of county commissioners of any county may, by resolution, establish a county automatic data processing board. The board shall consist of
the county treasurer or his representative, a member or representative of the
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courts and, as such, did not require prior approval of the county automatic data processing board to purchase, lease, operate, or contract for use and services of the Ohio Bar Automated Research
System.

R16

Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 440 F. Supp.
1175 (W.D. Pa. 1977).

In proceedings to determine the amount of attorneys' fees to
which a successful antitrust plaintiff was entitled, the court held, inter alia, that a charge for the use of a CALR system was recoverable. The court reasoned that the LEXIS computer service
"replaces by instantaneous and supposedly infallible retrieval, many
hours which would be billable if performed by human talent. The
amount allowable, however, is merely the cost of the service. The
the LEXIS
item is expressed in terms of hours merely because
'26
users.
to
basis
that
on
available
made
is
machine

R17 In re Use of Official Law Reports by a Commercial Legal Research Service, Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of
New York, July 21, 1964, reprinted in 142 U.S.P.Q. 288 (1964).
Judge John P. Lomenzo inquired of New York State Attorney
General's Office concerning the use by a commercial legal research
service of the official law reports of the State of New York. The Attorney General responded that the text of opinions of the courts of
the State of New York are in the public domain and may be published and used without copyright infringement. When, however, a
copyright is taken in the name of the Secretary of State, pursuant to
Section 438 of the New York Judiciary Act, 27 the copyrighted stateboard of county commissioners chosen by the board, and the county auditor
or his representative who shall serve as secretary.
After the initial meeting of the county automatic data processing board,
no county office shall purchase, lease, operate, or contract for the use of any
automatic data processing equipment without prior approval of the board.
As used in sections 307.84 to 307.846 [307.84.6], inclusive, of the Revised
Code, "county office" means any officer, department, board, commission,
agency, court, or other office of the county.
OHio REV. STAT. § 307.84 (1967).

26. 440 F. Supp. at 1178.
27. The copyright of the statements of facts, of the headnotes and of all other
notes or references prepared by the law reporting bureau must be taken by
and shall be vested in the Secretary of State for the benefit of the people of
the state. The Secretary of State is authorized by a writing filed in his office
to grant to any person, firm or corporation, under such terms and conditions
as he may determine to be for the best interests of the state, the right to pub-
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ments of fact, headnotes, and all other matter prepared by the law
reporting bureau and appearing in the official reports may not be
used as part of any publication of such texts in the absence of express legislative authorization.
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West Publishing Co. v. Law Research Service, Inc., 3 CLSR 561
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).

West Publishing Co. ("West") sued Law Research Service, Inc.
("LRS") for copyright infringement, and sought injunctive relief and
monetary damages. West alleged that LRS purported to do computer-assisted legal research and had copied certain West Key
Number digest indices. LRS filed a counterclaim, seeking, inter
alia, injunctive relief and monetary damages for alleged antitrust
violations. A settlement was reached without either party admitting the allegations contained in the pleadings.
The settlement, in part, (1) stipulated dismissal of all claims
and counterclaims, (2) barred recovery of damages and costs, (3)
noted the pendency of LRS' bankruptcy proceedings, (4) included
LRS' representations that West's copyrighted works had not been
utilized after infringement notices, and that such material, including
the data bank, had been destroyed, (5) precluded future sale or publication of certain works and of said data bank, (6) prohibited the
copying by any process of a table of cases or descriptive-word index
of West's digests or practice books, unless such copying was subsequently found legally permissible or future infringers were not sued,
in which cases, these proscriptions would be modified in accordance
with specified notice provisions, (7) allowed West to retain the computer printout obtained during discovery proceedings, and (8) precluded West from creating or selling a CALR service substantially
identical to that offered by LRS, as that system was revealed in the
documents produced and depositions taken during the discovery
phase of the suit.

lish the above mentioned copyrighted matter in an annotated edition of the
law reporting bureau or its predecessors which have been heretofore issued.
Such publication shall be made without cost to the state, and nothing in this
section contained shall otherwise affect the obligation of any contract for the
publication of such reports.
N.Y. Jun. ACT. § 438 (1938).

